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PURGING THE MISUSE-SUGGESTIONS FOR A
REASONABLE BALANCE OF CONFLICTING POLICIES
ALAN J STATMAN*

Misuse is a defense in a patent infringement action that has its
roots in the equitable doctrine of unclean hands.' The defense normally arises when a patentee uses its publicly granted monopoly to2
violate the antitrust laws. In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,
the Supreme Court established the general rule that "courts of equity, may appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is
using the right asserted contrary to the public interest."' 3 A court
therefore may refuse to aid a patentee's misuse "by declining to
"4
entertain a suit for infringement
'A corollary of the misuse doctrine, as stated in B.B. Chemical Co.
v. Ellis, 5 IS that a patentee that has been found guilty of misusing

its patent has a "right to relief when it is able to show that it has
fully abandoned its present method of restraining competition
and that the consequences of that practice have been fully dissipated." 6 The equitable remedy of purge thus has developed as a
relief from the harshness of the misuse doctrine. Remedy allows the
once it has cleansed itself enerring patentee to enforce its patent
7
tirely of the particular misuse.
* B.S., Oregon State University; J.D., Syracuse University College of Law. Law Clerk to
the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida. The conclusions expressed in
this article are those of the author and are not, nor are they intended to be, the views of the
court.
1. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957); W.L. Gore
& Assocs., Inc. v. Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d 614, 622 (3d Cir. 1976); Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc.,
306 F Supp. 541, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir:),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972). For a discussion of misuse and purge as equitable in nature,
see In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 472 F Supp. 170, 171-73 (S.D. Fla.
1979).
2. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
3. Id. at 492.
4. Id. at 493. The doctrine "is a harsh and repelling rule." Nicoson, Misuse of the Misuse
Doctrine in Infringement Suits, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 76, 99 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Nicoson]; Note, Dissipationof Patent Misuse, 1968 Wis. L. Rav. 918, 918 [hereinafter cited as
Note, Dissipation].
5. 314 U.S. 495 (1942).
6. Id. at 498.
7. See Note, Dissipation, supra note 4, at 919-21. See also In re Yam Processing Patent
Validity Litigation, 472 F Supp. 170 (S.D. Fla. 1979), wherein the court stated:
Since the defense of misuse is equitable in nature, and based on a strong
public policy against allowing one who wrongfully uses a patent to enforce it
during the misuse, the remedy of purge has developed, requiring that there be
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In the years since Morton Salt and B.B. Chemical Co., a body of
case law has developed concerning the remedy of purge. Because
purge is basically a question of fact 8 to be decided in each case by
the trial court in its discretion, the application of this law follows
no set pattern.' In light of the multitude of complex factual situations possible in these cases, the flexibility inherent in a trial court's
wide use of discretion is the appropriate, if not the only, way to
decide the issue fairly Nevertheless, the law of purge should have
some parameters determined by the public policies underlying both
the patent misuse doctrine and the antitrust laws. That there is a
close relationship between the patent misuse doctrine and the antitrust laws is well recognized. The patent misuse doctrine is tied
closely to the public interest in restraining the patentee from engaging in anticompetitive arrangements that violate those laws. 0 After
a brief historical introduction, this Article discusses recent trends
a showing that a dissipation or purge of the effects of the misuse has occurred,

before the patentee may enforce his patent.
Id. at 172.
Although the purge issue seems appropriate for a court of equity, the decision in Beacon
Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), and its progeny, may require a trial by jury.
Beacon Theatres states that if common fact issues between equitable and legal claims exist,
the legal issue should be tried first so as not to deny a party his right to a jury trial. A recent
case, Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979), narrowed the holding in Beacon
Theatres, and the district court in Yarn Processing explicitly refused to interpret Beacon
Theatres as mandating trial by jury on the legal infringement issue before trial to the court
of the equitable purge issue. 472 F Supp. at 173-74. At least one court, however, has submitted both misuse and purge issues to a jury. See De Buit v. Harwell Enterprises, 540 F.2d 690,
694 (4th Cir. 1976) (no appeal taken so decision not reviewed).
8. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957); Koratron
Co. v. Lion Uniform, Inc., 409 F Supp. 1019, 1022-23 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
9. Preformed Line Prods. v. Fanner Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 265, 279 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 846 (1964). See Koratron Co. v. Lion Uniform, Inc., 409 F Supp. 1019, 1023 (N.D.
Cal. 1976).
10. Wallace, Proper Use of the Patent Misuse Doctrine-An Antitrust Defense to Patent
Infringement Actions In Need of Rational Reform, 26 MERCER L. REv. 813, 814 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Wallace].
One author has suggested that the misuse doctrine be "purged" of all antitrust considerations. See Nicoson, supra note 4, at 105-10.
A violation of the antitrust laws need not be found for the defense of misuse to be asserted
if the circumstances and arrangements that gave rise to that misuse tend to restrain competition or have anticompetitive effects. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488
(1942); Berhlenbach v. Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 830 (1964); Stewart v. Mo-Trim Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. 410 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Laitram
Corp. v. King Crab Inc., 245 F Supp. 1019 (D. Alas. 1965). The majority of cases discussed
in this Article, however, involve such violative arrangements.
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in the law of purge in light of these public interest considerations.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MISUSE

DoCmI

Contributory Infringement
The misuse doctrine was applied originally as a defense in contributory infringement cases." In Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.,

2

the Supreme Court, over a dissent

by Justice Holmes, refused to allow the petitioner to extend its
patent monopoly The petitioner had restricted the use of its patented machines through the requirement that operators use certain
nonpatented materials necessary for their operation. 3 The Court
stated that the patentee's monopoly on a machine "is not concerned
with and has nothing to do with the materials with which or on
which the machine operates." 4 Quoting from the case of Kendall v.
Winsor,'1the Court stated, "'It is undeniably true, that the limited
and temporary monopoly granted to inventors was never designed
for their exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit to the public or
community at large was another and doubtless the primary object
in granting and securing that monopoly '"
In Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development
Corp., 17 the Court held that a patentee cannot make the use of its
11. Contributory infringement occurs when one aids another in the direct infringement of
a patent. 4 D. CHmsUM, PATENTS § 17.01 (1979).
12. 243 U.S. 502 (1916). This case expressly overruled Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1
(1912). 243 U.S. at 518. The Court noted that the so-called merit of the Dick Co. system,
allowing the owner of a patent to sell his machine practically at cost and to derive his profits
from the sale of supplies, "is the clearest possible condemnation of, the practice adopted,
in effect extending the power to the owner of the patent to fix the price to the public of the
unpatented supplies as effectively as he may fix the price on the patented machine." Id. at
517. The Court concluded, "It is obvious that the conclusions arrived at in this opinion ate
such that the decision in Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, must'be regarded as overruled." Id.
at 518.
13. Id. at 518-19. Justice Holmes rejected the majority's reasoning because under Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 422 (1907), the patentee could
keep its device totally out of use for whatever reason it chose. Id. at 519 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes observed, "I cannot understand why he may not keep it out of use
unless the licensee, or, for the matter of that, the buyer, will use some unpatented thing in
connection with it." Id. He also stated that the rule of Henry v. A.B. Dick Co. had risen
to "a rule of property that law and justice require to be retained." Id. at 520.
14. Id. at 512.
15. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 327-28 (1858).
16. 243 U.S. at 511.
17. 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
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patented article conditioned on the use of an unpatented substance.
Thus, a competitor was not liable for contributory infringement
despite its knowledge that its product was being used in machines
8
like those described in the patent.'
In Leitch Manufacturing Co. v. Barber Co., 9 the Supreme Court
completed its development of the misuse defense in cases of contributory infringement. The Court found that whether the expansion
of the patent was "'by contract, notice or otherwise'" was irrelevant.2" Thus, the Court concluded that "every use of a patent as a
means of obtaining a limited monopoly of unpatented material is
prohibited.
It applies whatever the nature of the device by
which the owner of the patent seeks to effect such unauthorized
extension of the monopoly

"21

Direct Infringement
In 1942 the Court first applied the misuse defense in a case of
direct infringement. In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Supptger Co.,2 2 the

respondent alleged that the petitioner had infringed directly its
patent for a salt tablet depositor by manufacturing and leasing an
unpatented, similar machine. 23 In its defense, the petitioner alleged
that the respondent had misused its patent by requiring licensees
to use unpatented salt tablets with its patented machine. 24 The
Supreme Court upheld the entry of summary judgment for the petitioner.25 The Court stated that the reason for extending the doctrine
of misuse to a case of directly infringement was the same as that
underlying application of the doctrine in a suit for contributory
infringement: a refusal to hear the infringement suit would be in the
public interest. 21 In reaching this conclusion, the Court balanced the
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 32-33.
302 U.S. 458 (1938).
Id. at 463.
Id.
314 U.S. 488 (1942).
Id. at 489-90.
Id.
Id. at 489-90, 494.
The Court stated the following:
The reasons for barring the prosecution of such a suit against one who is not

a competitor with the patentee in the sale of the unpatented product are fundamentally the same as those which preclude an infringement suit against a licensee who has violated a condition of the license by using with the licensed ma-
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public interest in free enterprise with the property rights of the
patent holder and the constitutional purpose of promoting "the
Progress of Science and useful Arts
"27 Thus, the patentee was
not permitted to enlarge the patent beyond its legitimate scope. Of
paramount importance was not the effect of the misuse on the defendant, but the "adverse effect upon the public interest."2 Justice
Douglas summarized this concept in Mercold Corp. v. MidContinent Investment Co. 2 as follows:
The patent is a privilege. But it is a privilege which is conditioned
by a public purpose. It results from invention and is limited to
the invention which it defines. When the patentee ties something
else to his invention, he acts only by virtue of his right as owner
of property to make contracts concerning it and not otherwise. He
then is subject to all limitations upon that right which the general
law imposes upon such contracts. The contract is not saved by
anything in the patent laws because it relates to the invention.
If it were, the mere act of the patentee could make the distinctive
claim of the patent attach to something which does not possess
the quality of invention. Then the patent would be diverted from
its statutory purpose and become a ready instrument for economic control in domains where the anti-trust acts or other laws
not the patent statutes define the public policy 11
The particular type of anticompetitive violation involved is not a
factor in determining whether the misuse defense should be allowed.3" The misuse doctrine primarily has been used in cases inchine a competing unpatented article
It is the adverse effect upon the
public interest of a successful infringement suit, in conjunction with the patentee's course of conduct, which disqualifies him to maintain the suit, regardless
of whether the particular defendant has suffered from the misuse of the patent.
Id. at 493-94 (citations omitted).
27. See id. at 492-93. The quoted language is from article I of the Constitution. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8,cl. 8. That the policy underlying the Morton Salt decision was solely that of the
patent laws is clear. Antitrust considerations were infused into the misuse doctrine soon
thereafter. See Nicoson, supra note 4, at 84-90; Wallace, supra note 10, at 817 & n.20.
28. 314 U.S. at 494. Confusion exists as to what that public interest is. See Alfred Bell &
Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951); Nicoson, supra note 4, at 105-09.
29: 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
30. Id. at 666.
31. "It is sufficient to say that in whatever posture the issue may be tendered courts of
equity will withhold relief where the patentee and those claiming under him are using the
patent privilege contrary to the public interest." Id. at 669 (emphasis supplied). See also
Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F Supp. 541, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd m part,rev'd in part,
448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972) ("As it is an equitable doctrine its
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volving illegal tying arrangements in which the patent holder has
used the patent to expand its monopoly by requiring the purchase
of unpatented goods for use with patented articles. 32 Several cases,
however, illustrate the successful application of the misuse doctrine
to violations of the antitrust laws such as price-fixing, 33 customer
restrictions, 3 and other anticompetitive arrangements.3 5 The central inquiry is whether "'the patent itself significantly contributes'
to the unlawful practice. ' 38 In other words, the misuse defense may
be asserted if the patentee is using its patent in violation of the
antitrust laws. If "the patent plays a major role in enabling its
holder unlawfully to restrain trade, public policy against abuse of
the limited lawful monoply requires that its enforcement against
infringers be stayed until the effects of the restraint have been
purged or dissipated."3 Misuse of a patent therefore in no way
affects the patent's validity; once the patentee has purged itself of
the misuse, absent invalidity on other grounds, the patent is enforceable in an infringement action.u
THE LAW OF PURGE
The law of purge developed as a response to the harshness of the
misuse defense, which restrains a patentee from asserting its claim
against potential infringers. The law of purge places the burden on
the patentee to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it
clearly and unequivocally has abandoned the misuse and that the
bad effects and consequences of misuse have dissipated. 9 This secapplication is not limited to any particular type of antitrust violation.").
32. See, e.g., McCullough Tool Co. v. Wells Surveys Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 933 (1966); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 375 F Supp. 1, 71-72
(N.D. Cal. 1974); Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F Supp. 541, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972); Valmont
Indus., Inc. v. Yuma Mfg. Co., 296 F Supp. 1291, 1295 (D. Colo. 1969).
33. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 (1957); In re Yam
Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 541 F.2d 1127, 1139-42 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 910 (1977).
34. Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1957).
35. See Wallace, supra note 10, at 817-19.
36. Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F Supp. 541, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972) (quoting A7r'Y GEN.'s NAT'L
COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT 251 (1955)).

37. Id.
38. Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252, 261 (5th Cir. 1967).

39. Note, Dissipation,supra note 4, at 923-26.
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tion will explore various aspects of the law of purge from its origins
in the Morton Salt and B.B. Chemical cases.
Central Policies Underlying the Development of Purge as a Remedy
The doctrine of misuse developed on the basis of dual policy
grounds: those underlying the patent laws, which do not permit the
patentee to expand its special privilege of patent monopoly in contravention of the public interest past the confines of its patent; and
those embodied in the federal antitrust laws, which restrain the
patentee from using its patent for anticompetitive activities."0 The
purge remedy is an attempt to balance these strong public policies
with two countervailing policies: the need to protect the incentive
for developing science and technology, which is the stated purpose
of the constitutional grant of patent monopoly; and the lesserincluded necessity of restraining potential infringers from violating
the patent laws." Equity courts should consider the purge issue with
42
these competing principles in mind.
In many cases, the wrong done to the public interest may be
greater if potential infringers are allowed to remain free from suit
than if the erring patentee is allowed to sue for infringement despite
some lingering effects of that misuse. This possibility may compel
the conclusion that a lesser standard of purge should be accepted
that permits the patentee to assert its rights at the earliest reasonable time after effective abandonment. The lesser standard of purge
is more consistent with its equitable underpinnings because equitable relief is remedial in nature, not punitive.4 3 The inability of the
40. In discussing the possible conflict between the antitrust and patent policies that underlie the misuse defense, one author has remarked, "[I]f there is in fact really any conflict-the
defense has enabled infringers to avoid liability, at least until the effects of improper conduct
are 'purged.'" Wallace, supra note 10, at 817. Another commentator has stated that in no
misuse case yet decided has clear conflict arisen between the patent and antitrust laws.
Nicoson, supra note 4, at 110. See also Markey, Special Problems in Patent Cases, 66 F.R.D.
529, 535 (1975). This writer believes that the policy conflict, if any, can be dealt with effectively in deciding the purge issue.
41. Note, Dissipation, supra note 4, at 924-25.
42. A similar balance of interests underlies the application of the misuse doctrine but has
not as yet been adopted by the courts. See Wallace, supra note 10, at 820-21. This writer
believes that a successful balance can be struck on the purge issue once a misuse has been
found.
43. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 435 (1945). An overly harsh application of the misuse doctrine may rise to the level of outright confiscation. Nicoson, supra
note 4, at 107.
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patentee to assert its rights against infringers amounts to a fine
imposed by the court and a large windfall profit to those guilty of
the unlawful activity
This is not to say that courts should permit patentees to enforce
their patents without a clear and affirmative abandonment of the
illegal practices. The major problem occurs with the duty of the
patentee to show dissipation of the effects of the misuse. This serious question involves the necessary extent of affirmative action on
the part of the patentee to dissipate the effects and consequences
of misuse. It has been argued that a patentee that has entered into
an illegal price-fixing scheme, the effect of which presumptively
causes an incentive not to patronize alternative technology, must
show the following: that the improper practices have been abandoned and that alternative technologies have developed to the point
that they would have absent the misuse." Following this reasoning
44. This position was argued by the yarn producers (Tnrowsters) in a multidistrict case,
In re Yam Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 472 F Supp. 180, 187 & n.13 (S.D. Fla.
1979). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit previously had found that an agreement
between the patentee and certain machinery manufacturers that contained a rebate provision
for machines sold under license from the patentee constituted price-fixing. In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 541 F.2d 1127, 1139-42 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 910 (1977). The court of appeals, in finding the patents misused and unenforceable, had
cited United States v. Line Matenal, 333 U.S. 287 (1948) for support in stating, "Such an
arrangement goes beyond the evils of Line Material because the non-patentee machinery
manufacturers are left with less incentive to patronize alternative technology as well as the
reduced incentive to do so on the part of the patent holders." 541 F.2d 1127, 1142 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977). The Throwsters relied on this language of the Fifth
Circuit to support their contention that in fact less incentive had existed to develop alternative technologies. 472 F Supp. at 187 n.13, 190 n.17.
The district court summarized the position of the Throwsters as follows:
The Throwsters argue that to show full dissipation, Lex Tex must establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that there is no longer a disincentive to
patronize alternative technology on the part of the manufacturers, and that
alternative technology has developed to the point that it would have, but for the
illegal activities that constituted misuse. The Throwsters also contend that this
alternative technology must be commercialized and "competitive" with the
patented technology of Lex Tex. To prove the technology is "competitive," they
contend Lex Tex must show the alternative technology is interchangeable
for the same end uses; is substantially equivalent in use and economy.
Id. at 187 n.13.
At the "purge trial," the district court did not reach the issue of what necessary steps
the patentee had to take to establish full dissipation of adverse effects. It found purge based
solely upon effective abandonment of the illegal provisions. Id. at 191. The district court
viewed the Fifth Circuit's "alternative technology" language as mere inferences or conclusions of law, rather than findings of fact. Id. at 190 & n.17. Although the burden of rebutting
a presumption of adverse effects from the misuse was placed on the plaintiff, id. at 190 n.17,
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to its ultimate conclusion, the patentee would have to prove dissipation of presumed effects, evidence of which would not be of record
at trial.45 This expansive view of dissipation would cause a trial
court to speculate on matters well outside its competency, is totally
unwarranted based on the patent policies underlying both purge
and the misuse doctrine, and places an intolerable burden on the
patentee trying to enforce its patent."6
The Elements of Purge
The first part of the two-pronged test of purge is that the patentee
must clearly and unequivocally abandon the misuse.4" Because
many of the antitrust violations that constitute misuse involve illegal tying arrangements or price-fixing agreements,48 the patentee
generally must show by a preponderance of the evidence that it
effectively has repudiated the illegal agreement or portion of the
agreement constituting the misuse.49 The repudiation may be unilateral when the illegal condition is for the protection or benefit of
the patentee." Under most circumstances, unilateral action will suffice if it is clear and unequivocal, even if the illegal clause or agreement is mutually advantageous to all parties.51
the court found that the plaintiff had met this burden by introducing evidence that showed
the noneffect of the misuse on the industry. Id. at 190-91, 190 n.17. Thus, for the plaintiff to
show dissipation of the adverse effects of the misuse was unnecessary because none existed.
The court refused to presume conclusively that adverse effects existed. Id. at 187 n.13.
See notes 69-75 infra & accompanying text for a discussion of burden of proof and presumptive effects. That issue also is discussed extensively in Note, Dissipation,supra note 4,
at 923-26. Some procedural aspects of the Yarn Processingcase are discussed in Statman,
The Defensive Use of CollateralEstoppel in MultidistrictLitigationAfter Parklane, 83 DICK.
L. Rav. 469, 484-85, 484 n.100, 485 n.103 (1979).
45. See the summary of the Throwsters' argument m note 44 supra.
46. See notes 64-68 infra & accompanying text.
47. Koratron Co. v. Lion Uniform, Inc., 409 F Supp. 1019, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Ansul
Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F Supp. 541, 560-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd in part,rev'd in part,
448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972).
48. See notes 31-36 supra & accompanying text.
49. In some instances, the illegal provision may be severable from the entire agreement.
See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Bulldog Elec. Prods. Co., 179 F.2d 139, 146 (4th Cir. 1950);
In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 472 F Supp. 180, 186 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
50. McCullough Tool Co. v. Wells Surveys Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 933 (1966); Eastern Venetian Blind Co. v. Acme Steel Co., 188 F.2d 247, 252 (4th
Cir. 1951) (under the direction of the district court); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Bulldog
Elec. Prods. Co., 179 F.2d 139, 146 (4th Cir. 1950).
51. In re Yam Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 472 F Supp. 180, 185-86 (S.D. Fla.
1979). In Yarn Processing,the court rejected defendant's contention that unilateral abandon-
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Any acts inconsistent with clear and unequivocal abandonment
will be fatal to the patentee's cause.12 This may amount to silence
or inaction.13 One court therefore has stated that unequivocal affirmative action is required on the part of the patentee.54 That court
refused to find purge based on "economic reality" or the passage of
time. 55 Nonenforcement of a clause or agreement is insufficient to
establish abandonment under this test because the patentee may
choose to enforce it at any time." The patentee must make the other

parties to the agreement aware of the unequivocal abandonment in
order to satisfy this first requirement.57
When the illegality arises solely out of a contractual clause, several courts have held that abandonment removes the misuse and the
patentee may enforce its patent without a further showing of dissipation. On the other hand, when the illegality "consists of extensive and aggravated misconduct over a period of several years,
ment was insufficient because it was advantageous to the manufacturers and not the patentee. The court found that the provisions were mutually advantageous and then stated:
"[T]he Court does not view this as a distinction sufficient to justify rejection
of Lex Tex's claims of purge. The Court is concerned only with whether the
practices which gave rise to the finding of patent misuse no longer are being
followed. If an abandonment serving to terminate the misuse has in fact occurred, it matters not whether it resulted from mutual or unilateral action."
Id. at 186 n.12 (quoting language from a previous order by the same court). See also Metals
Disintegrating Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 228 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1956).
52. In re Yam Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 472 F Supp. 180, 184-85 (S.D. Fla.
1979); Koratron Co. v. Lion Uniform, Inc., 409 F Supp. 1019, 1022-23 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Stewart v. Mo-Trnm Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. 410,412 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc.,
306 F Supp. 541, 460-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972).
53. Koratron Co. v. Lion Uniform, Inc., 409 F Supp. 1019, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The court
m In re Yam Patent Validity Litigation, 472 F Supp. 180 (S.D. Fla. 1979), also noted that
the dissemination by the patent holder of information that was misleading or incomplete
through widely-circulated trade notices was sufficient to find lack of abandonment. Id. at 185.
54. Koratron Co. v. Lion Uniform, Inc., 409 F Supp. 1019, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
55. Id.
56. Hensley Equip. Co. v Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252, 261 (5th Cir. 1967). See also Berhlenbach v. Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782, 785 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
830 (1964); In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 472 F Supp. 180, 184 (S.D. Fla.
1979); Koratron Co. v. Lion Uniform, Inc., 409 F Supp. 1019, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
57. Metals Disintegrating Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 228 F.2d 885, 889 (3d Cir. 1956);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Bulldog Elec. Prods. Co., 179 F.2d 139, 146 (4th Cir. 1950).
58. See, e.g., White Cap Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 203 F.2d 694 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 876 (1953); Campbell v. Mueller, 159 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1947). Cf. In re Yarn
Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 472 F Supp. 180, 186-91 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (undertaking
extensive inquiry to determine whether there were ill effects to be dissipated).
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which has substantially rigidified the price structure of an entire
market and suppressed competition over a wide area, affirmative
to dispel the consequences of the unaction may be essential
lawful conduct.""9
The foregoing discussion makes clear that the extent of the illegality, its effect in the industry, and the nature of the antitrust offense
all are factors to be considered by the courts in determining whether
purge is effectuated by abandonment of the misuse. This determination is a factual one within the wide discretion of the trial court
and not readily reviewable by the appellate court.'"
The second element of purge places on the patentee the burden
of showing that the "consequences of [the misuse] have been fully
dissipated."'" An analysis of dissipation necessarily centers on what
these effects or consequences are and whether the language "fully
dissipated" must be read literally
The earlier analysis demonstrates that courts separate misuse
cases into two categories. In the first category are those cases in
which the misuse involves an illegal agreement or contractual provision only In these cases, the abandonment of the illegal agreement
or provision itself may constitute purge.62 In the second category are
those cases in which the misuse is more extensive, with wideranging effects throughout a whole market or industry 63 These latter cases have asserted that affirmative action on the part of the
patentee is necessary "to dispel the consequences of the unlawful
conduct."64 Such a requirement seems reasonable when viewed in
the context of the public policy of not permitting the patentee to
benefit from violating the antitrust laws. The issue, however, is
whether the burden on the patent holder literally should be to re59. Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F Supp. 541, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972). See also Koratron Co. v.
Lion Uniform, Inc., 409 F Supp. 1019, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
60. See, e.g., Preformed Line Prods. Co. v. Fanner Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 265, 278-79 (6th Cir.),
cert. dented, 379 U.S. 846 (1964); Koratron Co. v. Lion Uniform, Inc., 409 F Supp. 1019, 1023
(N.D. Cal. 1976).
61. This is the general formulation of the rule, first articulated by the Supreme Court in
B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942).
62. See notes 48-58 supra & accompanying text. See also Water Assoc. Inc. v. Instrumentation Specialties Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. 388, 394 (D. Neb. 1978).
63. Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F Supp. 541, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972) (citing Preformed Line
Prods. Co. v. Fanner Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 265, 279 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 846 (1964)).

64. Id.
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turn conditions to the status quo.
The more appropriate inquiry should be into the intent evinced
by the "purging" conduct. 5 For example, that any antitrust or patent policy is served by allowing potential infringers to violate the
patent laws free of the fear of enforcement due to the misuse seems
unlikely Carried to a logical extreme, a patentee never could purge
its misuse because the potential infringers resisted the patentee's
attempt to dissipate the effects of its misuse."6 If a price-fixing arrangement exists in which agreements between a patentee and its
manufacturers provide an incentive to the manufacturers to produce the patentee's machines, the question arises whether the inability or refusal of those manufacturers to develop alternative technology would be an effect that the patentee must dissipate in its
entirety A related question is whether the patentee must develop
this technology 11 Furthermore, the threat of a successful infringement action by the patentee might deter manufacturers from engaging in research and development because, due to the misuse, they
may sell free of any such action. If a patentee has misused its patent, must it also counteract this effect? Such an inquiry by the
courts will lead them down a path better left untrod. Matters such
as the equivalence of highly complex technologies are not susceptible to simple proof and leave much room for speculation and serious
error.68
65. Although its holding may be viewed as being particularly hostile to the erring patentee,
the court in Koratron Co. v. Lion Uniform, Inc., 409 F Supp. 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1976), noted
the importance of intent in finding purge: "[T]he focus of the Court's analysis was the intent
that Koratron's conduct evidenced, a factor appropriate for a court of equity which must
decide whether to remove a sanction for prior bad acts." Id. at 1028. See also Note,
Dissipation,supra note 4, at 921-22 (stating that some courts have found dissipation based
upon good faith efforts).
66. In light of the strong language of some courts, a patentee may find itself in this position.
See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 669 (1944) ("courts of equity
will withhold relief where the patentee and those claiming under him are using the patent
privilege contrary to the public interest"). But see Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Bulldog Elec.
Prods. Co., 179 F.2d 139, 146 (4th Cir. 1950) ("We think, however, that the stipulation shows
that the effects have been sufficiently purged to enable Westinghouse to ask the courts to
protect its rights.") (emphasis supplied).
67. See note 44 supra for the discussion of a patentee's duty to show dissipation of adverse
effects.
68. See note 44 supra & accompanying text.

1979]

PURGING THE MISUSE

The Theory of Unpurgible Misuse and the Patentee's Burden
The burden on the patentee to show that all consequences and
effects have been totally dissipated might make the establishment
of purge impossible for the patentee."9 Under traditional antitrust
principles, this approach might be defensible. 0 In a patent infringement action, however, the weight of patent policies should at least
equal that of antitrust policies. An unpurgible misuse should be
found only in rare instances. The rights of the public may be as
damaged by the disregard of the patent policies that results from
the application of the misuse doctrine, as they are by the patentee's
illegal anticompetitive restraints. A court sitting in equity should
balance these public policies in determining the purge issue.
A recent case justifiably finding an unpurgible misuse was
Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron Inc.7 1 The Sixth

Circuit refused to reverse the district court's finding that the patent
was unenforceable. The rationale of that holding was that the procurement of the patent had been fraudulent; the inequitable conduct of the patentee thus prevented a finding of purge. 72 The unpurgible misuse theory properly should be restricted to cases in which
the patentee commits grossly inequitable conduct and should not
rear its head in the typical misuse case.
The language of the purge cases stresses that the burden is on the
patentee to show that the effects of the misuse have been dissipated.
This language, however, presupposes a factual finding of effects and
consequences. If the record is devoid of proof that these consequences and effects actually exist, then purge should be found withaction required on the part of the
out any inquiry into affirmative
73
patentee in order to dissipate.
69. See, e.g., B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942); Preformed Line Prod.
Co. v. Fanner Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 265, 279 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 846 (1964).
Although the language used in these cases is strong, the author believes that it is not applied
strictly by the courts. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Bulldog Elec. Prods. Co., 179
F.2d 139, 146 (4th Cir. 1950).
70. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946), wherein the Court
stated, "The most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of uncertainty which his own wrong has created." Id. at 265.
71. 562 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1977).
72. Id. at 371-72. This case was distinguished in In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity
Litigation, 472 F Supp. 180, 190 n.17 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
73. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957); White
Cap Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 203 F.2d 694, 698 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 876
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The tendency of appellate courts to draw from a finding of misuse
an inference that the misuse actually has adverse effects may cause
confusion." Such inferences should not be accorded the status of
findings of fact, which require the patentee to show by a preponderance of the evidence that all the adverse effects have dissipated.
Instead, if a court finds misuse without finding adverse effects, then
it might require the patentee only to produce evidence showing that
75
in fact there are no adverse effects to be dissipated.
CONCLUSION

When determining whether purge has been effectuated, courts of
equity should weigh on a case-by-case basis the public policies underlying the patent laws and the misuse doctrine in order to determine which course is most beneficial to the public interest. Courts
should not unreasonably burden the patentee by applying literally
the language of those cases that call for the dissipation of all effects
or consequences of the misuse. If no factual finding of adverse effects
has been made, then a patentee should be able to carry its burden
by producing evidence that shows abandonment of the illegal practice and that demonstrates no adverse effect actually existed. If a
(1953); In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 472 F Supp. 180, 186-91 (S.D. Fla.
1979); Printing Plate Supply Co. v. Crescent Engraving Co., 246 F Supp. 654, 673-74 (W.D.
Mich. 1965). See note 44 supra.
74. See cases cited in note 73 supra.
75. In In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 472 F Supp. 180 (S.D. Fla. 1979),
the district court placed the burden on the patentee to prove "that the incentive to patronize
alternative technology was [not] stifled." Id. at 190 n.17. This was based on the Fifth
Circuit's earlier opinion, which included language about alternative technology Id. That
court had before it only a summary judgment record "that [did] not even educate [it] as
to the existence of alternative technologies." 541 F.2d 1127, 1135 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. dented,
433 U.S. 910 (1977). The patentee carried its burden by producing evidence that no adverse
effects existed. See note 44 supra.
A student author has argued that the burden always should be on the defendant to show
the existence of effects to be dissipated. Note, Dissipation,supra note 4, at 923. He suggested
that the reason for the failure of the courts carefully to consider the problem of effects is
confusion over the burden of proof. Recent cases, however, such as Koratron Co. v. Lion
Uniform, Inc., 409 F Supp. 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1976) and Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F
Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd in part, rev'd n part, 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1018 (1972), do not support this view. The confusion over the burden on the patentee stems directly from the contradiction between the language of cases that places the
burden on the patentee to dissipate all the effects, presumed or otherwise, and the results of
cases that find purge based solely on effective abandonment. A literal application of the
expressed rule is both unwarranted by the policies underlying the purge remedy and extremely unjust to the patentee.
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court finds that adverse effects exist, then its major inquiry should
be whether the patentee has made a good faith effort to abandon
the misuse and dissipate whatever lingering effects the trial court
finds in the record before it. The doctrine of unpurgible misuse
should be limited to those situations in which the patentee has
acted fraudulently or inequitably

